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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the causes of inflation in CEMAC, with a particular 
attention to the monetary dimension.  Using a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) approach 
on CEMAC countries and data from 1990 to 2014, we show that money supply and imported 
inflation are the two main sources of inflation in CEMAC countries. These factors seem to 
explain inflation better than oil prices, budget balance and output gap.  Specifically, the results 
show that money supply causes about 24% of inflation’s variation while imported inflation 
explains about 6% of inflation’s fluctuations. However, an important inflation’s inertia is 
observed (64% in mean), enlightening some structural problems, in particular, the slowness of 
expectations adjustment of agents in CEMAC. 
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Déterminants de  l’inflation dans  la CEMAC : le  rôle  de  la monnaie 
Résumé 
L’objectif de cette étude est d’identifier les déterminants de l’inflation dans la CEMAC avec 
un regard  particulier  sur la masse monétaire.  À l’aide d’un modèle VAR en panel appliqué  
aux  pays  de la CEMAC  sur la période allant de 1990 à 2014, nous montrons que la masse 
monétaire  et l’inflation importée expliquent mieux l’évolution des prix dans la CEMAC  que 
le prix du pétrole,  le solde budgétaire  ou encore l’écart de production. Spécifiquement, les 
fluctuations  de l’inflation sont dues environ à 24% à la croissance de la masse monétaire 
contre 6% environ pour l’inflation importée. Toutefois, nous observons une très forte inertie 
de l’inflation (64% en moyenne), traduisant des problèmes structurels et particulièrement le 
lent ajustement des anticipations des agents économiques. 
Mots-clés : VAR  en panel,  Inflation,  Politique  monétaire,  politiques  des banques centrales. 
Codes JEL : C33, E30, E52, E58 
∗. Economist in the Research Department of the Bank of Central Africa States - BEAC 
∗∗.  Statistician in the Department of Studies and Financial Stability- BEAC 
∗ ∗ ∗.   Statistician in the Research Department - BEAC 
 
The authors thank the BEAC executives for their comments and remarks. Any errors and omissions contained in 
the document are the sole responsibility of the authors.
2 
 
Table of contents 
Non-Technical Summary ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 4 
1.Inflation in CEMAC .............................................................................................................................. 5 
1.1 Analysis of inflation in CEMAC: consumption functions Approach ............................................. 7 
1.2 Analysis of the determinants of inflation in CEMAC .................................................................... 8 
2. Determinants of inflation in developing countries: a brief review of the literature ........................... 10 
3. Determinants of inflation in CEMAC in a panel VAR....................................................................... 12 
3.1 Model and data ............................................................................................................................. 12 
3.2 Results and recommendations ...................................................................................................... 14 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 20 
References .............................................................................................................................................. 21 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
A. Methodology for calculating the imported inflation indicator ........................................................... 23 
B. Stationarity tests of variables ............................................................................................................. 23 
C. Maximum lag test .............................................................................................................................. 24 
D. Decomposition of inflation variance in a PVAR with two variables (money supply and inflation) . 24 
E. Response functions in the case of a PVAR with modification of the order of the variables ............. 24 
F. Response functions in the case of a structural PVAR ........................................................................ 26 
G. Response functions in the case of a PVAR with public  expenditure ................................................ 27 
H. Inflation in the CEMAC: background, calculation methods and limits............................................. 28 
General background on the Consumer Price Index ............................................................................ 28 
The transition to the HIPC .................................................................................................................. 28 
The calculation of inflation in CEMAC ............................................................................................. 29 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
Price stability is one of the main objectives of most central banks, including the Bank of 
Central African States (BEAC). From this perspective, a good knowledge of the potential 
causes (determinants) of price instability in the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CEMAC) is therefore of paramount importance for the Central Bank. 
The objective of this article is thus to identify the determinants of inflation in the CEMAC 
with particular emphasis on the money supply, with a view to, on the one hand, to help the 
Central Bank of the Community to have a better understanding of the sources of inflation in 
the economic space for which it is responsible, and on the other hand to guide the 
development of the monetary policy of the BEAC. 
Controlling the sources of inflation is crucial to understanding the strategies and orientations 
of monetary policies as it would be futile for any central bank to seek to stabilize prices on 
which it has no or very little influence. This is all the more important as price shocks can take 
a transitory or permanent form and, depending on the situation, require or not central bank 
intervention. 
From a theoretical point of view, inflation can result from several causes, both monetary and 
economic. These causes may come from the supply side or the demand side and influence 
inflation in the short, medium or long term. 
In the case of African countries, many studies tend to show that supply shocks tend to exert 
more pressure on prices. Thus, shocks on the prices of raw materials, essential goods, climatic 
and environmental hazards can generate inflation. Socio-political conflicts are also identified 
as potential sources of inflation in Africa. 
Using a panel VAR model estimated on the CEMAC data from 1990 to 2014, we show in this 
study that the money supply and imported inflation (the increase in the general price level of 
imported goods) are the main determinants of inflation in the CEMAC. They are much more 
significant than other factors such as the fiscal balance, the oil price or the output gap. 
Nevertheless, money supply and imported inflation account for only 30% (of which 24% for 
the money) of the dynamics of inflation. Almost 64% of this dynamic is determined by 
inflation itself. The observed inertia reflects not only structural problems, but also a slow 
adjustment of the economic agents' inflation expectations. 
Such results call on the authorities responsible for price stability issues. In other words, it 
seems useful for the Central Bank to understand that much of the price dynamics is beyond its 
reach. It would therefore be wise to give more weight to the analyzes of "core inflation" which 
is generally purged from short-term fluctuations and better reflects the weight of money in 
explaining prices. Such a choice would allow to better control the effect of central bank 
actions on prices. 
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Introduction 
The identification of inflation sources has significant importance for central banks not only 
because inflation has been one of their main objectives since the 1970s but also because of the 
role of the central bank in the regulation of inflationary pressures. The monetary tool can 
indeed be a good instrument for stimulating activity and fighting against inflation when the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy are functional. However, under the principle of 
"money neutrality" it is generally accepted in the long run that monetary policy affects only 
the general level of prices and not the real sector (output, unemployment). One of the 
consequences of this widely shared consensus in economics is that monetary policy decisions 
cannot effectively solve a short-run inflation problem that would rather be caused by factors 
other than money. 
Controlling the sources of inflation is therefore essential to understanding the strategies and 
orientations of monetary policies, since it would be futile for any central bank to seek to 
stabilize prices on which it has no or very little influence. This is all the more important since 
price shocks may take a transitory or permanent form and may require, depending on the 
situation, the intervention of the central bank. This problem has led several central banks to 
focus on controlling core inflation, that is, inflation which is supposed to be due to central 
bank actions and whose calculation excludes its potential fluctuations sources in the short-
term. 
In theory, price movements can be the result of several causes, both monetary and economic, 
from the supply side as well as the demand side and which can influence inflation in the short, 
medium or long term. 
Specifically, it is generally accepted in the long run that inflation is fundamentally a monetary 
phenomenon, it is caused by too much money creation (Friedman, 1956). This monetarist 
vision led several central banks in the 1970s, in relation to the stagflation situation observed at 
that time, to opt for a strategy of controlling the evolution of the money supply in order to 
guarantee the objective of price stability. Several empirical studies have highlighted money as 
the main determinant of inflation in developed countries (Gelarch and Svensson, 2003, 
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gelarch, 2006) compared to developing countries (Doe and 
Diarisso, 1997; Diouf, 2007, Diop et al, 2008, Barnichon and Peiris, 2008). 
In the short term, in contrast, it is recognized that changes in the general price level would be 
influenced by determinants such as changes in aggregate demand and supply, changes in 
commodity prices, technological change, exchange rate constraints, climate shocks (Blinder 
1982, Loungani and Swagel 2001, Fischer and al 2002, Catao and Toroness 2005, Diouf 2007, 
Barnichon and Peiris 2008, Kinda, 2011). 
Sociological, institutional, natural and socio-political factors can also affect the price level 
both in the short and long term and especially in developing countries. Some of these factors 
are due to the difficulties governments face in maintaining strong and sustainable economic 
growth with strong institutions. As such, inflation would result from factors that are not 
directly link to the action of the central bank and which are harmful to growth, notably the 
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insufficiency of private savings, the inadequacy of developed industries, wars and political 
unrest, landlocked countries, the quality of infrastructure, governance and the quality of 
institutions. For example, it would be difficult for a central bank to stabilize inflationary 
pressures caused by a climate of political tensions or to the isolation of a State with no 
opening to the sea and where all imported goods move through another country (Central 
African Republic and Chad).  
Factors such as subsidies from some sectors and products, the signing of contracts 
guaranteeing long-term low price between firms, the costs of multiplying negotiations and 
changing price catalogs (see the theory of menu costs) are also likely to influence prices and 
especially by making them more rigid. A good understanding of the factors likely to generate 
or limit inflationary pressures is therefore important in order to better guide economic policy 
decisions. 
Belonging to a monetary zone governed by Community disciplines in economic policy-
making, however, is beneficial to maintaining price stability. Indeed, countries that are 
generally unionized and have adopted a fixed exchange rate regime, such as those of 
CEMAC
1
 or WAEMU
2
, perform very well in stabilizing prices (Ghosh and al., 1995). In the 
CEMAC, for example, since the monetary reforms started in the 1990s, inflation is on average 
equal to the Community norm of 3%, but with disparities between countries. However, it is 
not certain that such a performance is due to the Central Bank policy. Indeed, in a context 
marked by a weakness in the transmission channels of monetary policy, it would be difficult 
to maintain a low price level due to the central bank's single action (Saxegaard, 2006; Bikai 
and Kenkouo, 2015). 
Since one of the objectives of the BEAC is to maintain internal stability by ensuring a low 
inflation rate, it is important to know what is the weight of the money in explaining price 
fluctuations. This requires identifying the determinants of inflation in the CEMAC. Such a 
study could allow and judge whether or not the central bank should act on all price 
fluctuations. 
The rest of the article will be divided into three sections. The first section will focus on the 
characteristics of inflation as observed in the CEMAC. The second section presents a brief 
literature on the determinants of inflation with particular emphasis on developing countries. 
The third section will be devoted to the presentation of the methodology, results and policy 
recommendations. 
1. Inflation in CEMAC 
In the CEMAC, inflation is apprehended by the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). Although, on average, the inflation rate of the CEMAC countries is close to the Central  
                                                          
1
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa composed of six States: Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. 
2
 West African Economic and Monetary Union 
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Bank's 3% standard, inflation levels by country differs widely from one to another, 
highlighting the potential heterogeneities between these countries and the difficulty that the 
Central Bank can have in carrying out an effective common monetary policy. 
As can be seen in Figure 1 below, some countries (Cameroon and Gabon) have had fairly 
well-controlled levels of inflation since the early 2000s, but other countries are characterized 
by relatively high levels of inflation volatility (Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea), which tends 
to stabilize over time (Chad case). For the Central African Republic, the inflation situation has 
deteriorated significantly over the past four years, in line with the political tensions it 
experienced during this period. This overall picture leads us to understand that the 
determinants of inflation are certainly not similar from one country to another, but the co-
movements observed between the different series may suggest that there are common factors 
dictating the structural evolution of inflation in the CEMAC. 
Figure 1 – Evolution of inflation in the CEMAC countries (2001 - 2014) 
 
Source: Authors using data from national administrations 
In recent years (2004-2014), the general level of prices in the CEMAC has experienced an 
average annual change of 2.8% for all countries, slightly below the Community norm of 3%. 
However, over the same period, the inflation rate exceeded the Community norm, in particular 
in 2005 (+ 3.4%), 2006 (+ 4.8%), 2008 (+ 6%), 2009 (+ 4.4%), 2012 (+ 3.8%) and 2014 (+ 
3.2%). The countries most affected by relatively high inflation were the Central African 
Republic (+ 4.7%), Equatorial Guinea (+ 4.6%) and Congo (+ 3.4%). Chad, Cameroon and 
Gabon experienced average inflation over the ten years of 2.8%, 2.5% and 2.3%, respectively.  
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Table 1 – Evolution of inflation rate in the CEMAC (in %) 
Source: BEAC’s data. 
These developments highlight the heterogeneities of these countries and, presumably, the 
difficulty that the central bank may have in conducting an effective policy of price 
stabilization. 
In order to better understand the determinants and factors that may influence the evolution of 
this index, we will follow two approaches: an approach by consumption functions and an 
approach by the determinants of inflation. 
 
1.1 Analysis of inflation in CEMAC: consumption functions Approach 
The analysis of inflation according to the consumption function approach makes it possible to 
identify the consumption pattern of agents and to analyze the functions subject to recurrent 
fluctuations. 
The most recent situation, as can be seen in Table 2 below, allows us to provide a primary 
analysis of the factors that may affect inflation within CEMAC. 
Table 2 - Evolution of the price index by consumption functions of the CEMAC (Base 100: year 2011) 
Consumption functions 2012 2013 2014 2015       Mean 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 106,3 108,4 112,9 115,7 110,8 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 101,3 103,2 107,4 111,4 105,8 
Clothing and footwear 102,3 103,6 106,5 110,3 105,7 
Housing, water, gas, electricity and other fuels 102,5 105,2 107,4 109,7 106,2 
Furniture, household articles and routine maintenance 102,2 104,9 108,4 109,9 106,4 
Health 100,9 102 104,4 104,3 102,9 
Transports 102,9 104,9 109,7 115,4 108,2 
Communications 97,9 96,1 96,6 93,2 95,9 
Leisure and culture 100,5 101,1 103 106,3 102,7 
Teaching 101,1 104,7 107,9 112 106,4 
Restaurants and hotels 103,5 105,9 111 116,1 109,1 
Miscellaneous goods and services 102,8 105 106,1 108,4 105,6 
General index 103,8 105,8 109,2 111,9 113,3 
Source: Authors using data from national administrations. 
Note: For the sake of consistency, the benchmark period was set for 2011 due to the adoption 
this year by all CEMAC countries of the COICOP nomenclature (Classification of Individual 
Consumption by Purpose) with 12 consumption functions. 
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If we limit ourselves to a recent analysis of inflation across the different consumption 
functions, we can see that the most inflationary functions are: Food and non-alcoholic 
beverages, Transport, Restaurants and hotels. Factors likely to influence these consumption 
functions could be potential determinants of inflation in CEMAC, especially in the short term. 
And as we can see, not all of these factors are directly link to the monetary policy of the 
central bank. For example, providing an efficient and low cost transport system to households 
depends more on a proactive policy of States to finance and maintain public infrastructures, 
the financing of which depends on its ability to collect revenues and to have a level of optimal 
and realistic expenditure. It should also be noted that much of the food and non-alcoholic 
beverages that have a preponderant weight in the household consumption function are 
imported. This situation suggests an influence of foreign prices or the exchange rate in the 
explanation of inflation in the CEMAC but also a rather limited importance of the money in 
the explanation of price fluctuations. 
1.2 Analysis of the determinants of inflation in CEMAC  
 
Theoretically, the explanation of price movements can be the result of several causes, both 
monetary and economic, from the supply side as well as the demand side and which can 
influence inflation in the short, medium or long term. Socio-political and environmental 
causes can also play a major role in explaining price fluctuations and the weight of all these 
factors may vary from country to country and even over time. 
As for the Central African Republic, the security situation of the country during the last ten 
years, marked by political tensions and the country's isolation, certainly played a role in 
explaining prices. For Equatorial Guinea and the Congo, in contrast, the inflation level may 
reflect fluctuations in the prices of raw materials, particularly oil, of which they are highly 
dependent. It should be noted that the weight of oil in the total exports of these countries is 
90% and 92% respectively. Factors such as money and government budget expenditures may 
also be the source of such price fluctuations. However, countries in the sub region with a 
structural deficit in balances of payment, and with consumption mainly oriented towards 
imported products, would also expect imported inflation to play a role in explaining prices.  
Among the factors that can influence prices in CEMAC, we shall limit ourselves in our 
analysis to endogenous factors, which can be influenced by the monetary and fiscal authorities 
(money supply and fiscal indicators) and exogenous factors such as changes in oil prices and 
imported inflation that are beyond the control of the economic policy authorities. 
As regards money, it may represent a source of fluctuation in prices in the CEMAC. As 
monetarist analyzes point out, too much money creation creates long-term inflationary 
pressures. Despite the weakness of the monetary policy transmission channels in the CEMAC 
(Saxegaard, 2006; Bikai and Kenkouo, 2015), the hypothesis of correlation between money 
supply and prices in the CEMAC cannot be rejected. Keungne and Ousman (2015) show that 
monetary growth in CEMAC is positively and strongly correlated with inflation from 1973 to 
2002, and after that date, the correlation between these two variables has decreased 
significantly. Such an evolution may be justified, among other things, by excess liquidity 
combined with credit rationing observed since the early 2000s. This result also implies that 
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factors other than money contributed to explain inflation during the 15 last years. However, 
from Figure 2 below, it would be difficult to conclude that changes in the money supply are 
unrelated to fluctuations in CEMAC inflation. 
Figure 2 – Inflation and the growth of money supply in CEMAC (in %) 
 
Source: Authors based on BEAC data. 
Another factor likely to influence inflation in the CEMAC could come from the fiscal policy. 
Indeed, the large share of government expenditure in the economies of the subregion is likely 
to affect many consumption items taken into account in the calculation of the consumer price 
index, such as housing, transport, water and electricity consumption. As the State is one of the 
biggest job-supplier and one of the biggest investors in the CEMAC countries, its action can 
therefore impact aggregate demand and affect activity and prices. The analysis in Figure 3 
below thus allows us to see that the movements of rise and fall in public expenditure in the 
CEMAC are sometimes accompanied by similar movements in inflation. But on the whole, 
this variable does not seem relevant in the explanation of price fluctuations. 
.Figure 3 – Change in public expenditure and inflation in CEMAC (in %) 
 
Source: Authors based on BEAC and national administrations data. 
Regarding oil, given its high weight in total CEMAC exports, changes in oil prices may 
represent a source of price fluctuations. Kenkouo (2015) shows that an increase in oil prices 
by 10% would be responsible for the increase in long-term inflation in the CEMAC in the 
range of 1.5 to 4 percentage points depending on the country. But in the short term, the 
existence of hydrocarbon stabilization funds in some countries would prevent excessive 
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fluctuations in inflation, these prices are generally adjusted only in the medium term to take 
account of real developments. 
Figure 4 – Inflation and oil price in CEMAC 
  
Source: Authors based on BEAC data.  
Note: GE-Equatorial Guinea; CN-Congo. 
Due to the strong extraversion of the CEMAC economies and the structural deficit in country 
balance of payments, imported inflation could also play a significant role in explaining price 
fluctuations in the sub region. In order to capture imported inflation, we constructed an 
indicator based on the inflation levels of the main partners in each country, weighted by the 
weight of trade with these partners in the overall external trade. As can be seen in Figure 5 
below, imported inflation into the CEMAC may explain some price movements in the 
CEMAC. 
Figure 5 – Imported inflation and inflation in the CEMAC (en %)
 
Source: BEAC and national administrations data. 
The existence of several determinants of inflation often leads central banks to choose a more 
useful indicator: core inflation, which is somehow purged from the main sources of short-term 
fluctuations. 
2. Determinants of inflation in developing countries: a brief review of the literature  
Several empirical studies have been conducted to identify the causes of inflation, which may 
be monetary, economic, sociological, socio-political or even environmental.  
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As for money, one cannot analyze the theory about the determinants of inflation, without 
recalling the famous and well-known affirmation of Milton Friedman (1970), "Inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can only be 
generated by an increase in the quantity of money faster than that of production." According 
to the latter, any excess of the money supply in relation to the real cash balances required for 
the economic agents, results in a rise in prices. The relevance of money growth as a 
determinant of inflation has been tested in many empirical studies and especially in developed 
countries. For example, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006) find that money supply 
growth is a determinant of inflation in Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Eurozone. 
However, in developing countries, Loungani and Swagel (2001) use a VAR approach to 
demonstrate with a sample of 53 developing countries that monetary growth and exchange 
rate fluctuations explain a large part of inflation movement more in countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes than in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. Moreover, 
Barnichon and Peiris (2007) use an error-correction model on a panel of 16 African countries 
and conclude that the gap between the quantities of money offered and demanded is a more 
determining factor of inflation than the production gap. Monetary variables would therefore 
be key long-term determinants of inflation. Doe and Diarisso (1997), Diouf (2007), Diop et al 
(2008) also reached the same conclusion for WAEMU countries. 
According to the economic approach, inflation is the result of an imbalance between supply 
and demand for goods and services. When aggregate demand grows faster than supply, it 
leads to an upward adjustment in prices to restore equilibrium. 
The Aggregate Supply-Aggregate demand approach emphasizes the influence of supply and 
demand shocks. Work on the determinants of inflation in some African countries highlights 
the preponderance of supply shocks in the activation of inflationary pressures such as shocks 
on commodity prices, production shortages due to unpredictable factors (climate problems, 
floods, wars?) or austerity policies. Thus, the economic approach to the determinants of 
inflation cannot be dissociated from some environmental factors that have a significant impact 
on supply shocks. 
As such, in West Africa, Zonon (2003) examines the determinants of inflation in Burkina 
Faso through an error-correction model that includes the money supply, external prices, 
exchange rate, production gap and per capita income. In addition to the monetary explanation 
of inflation, he also identifies fluctuations due to climatic conditions as significant 
determinants of inflation. Diouf (2007) also shows for Mali that climatic conditions influence 
the production of cereals and consequently the price level. 
In the same vein, Ndiaye (2008), using a consumption-based approach related to an error-
correction model on quarterly data from 2000-2007, shows that the functions "feed", 
"housing", and "clothing" would be the ones that most influence the evolution of inflation in 
Senegal. In addition, insufficient supply of foodstuffs would be an important factor explaining 
pressure on cereal prices, which is reflected in the general level of prices. 
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To go further, Nsengiyumva (2011) using a VAR model with five variables estimated from 
annual data over the period 1975 to 2008, shows that the general level of prices depends, in 
Burundi, on the evolution of the price of oil, the real exchange rate, GDP, the short-term 
interest rate, but also, and above all, on direct price increases. 
Simpasa and Gurara (2011), analyzing the causes of inflation in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda, highlight world prices for food and oil, domestic production, monetary, fiscal 
and interest rate policies as the main determinants of inflation in these countries of East 
Africa. Loening and Birru (2013) also highlighted, in the case of Ethiopia, the importance of 
international commodity prices in explaining inflation. 
Regarding work in Central Africa, Caceres and al (2011) use a panel VAR to show that food 
and oil prices affect the dynamics of non-monetary inflation for four or five quarters and their 
impact decreases substantially over time. Indeed, for these authors, past inflation influences 
current inflation due to the slow adjustment of the expectations of economic agents. In 
addition, fluctuations in the prices of food products such as wheat, maize, rice, palm oil and 
sugar would contribute between 10 and 15% to the explanation of price increase in Central 
Africa. Using the example of Chad, Kinda (2011) highlights as the determinants of inflation: 
rainfall and foreign price fluctuations, the combined effects of which would persist for six 
quarters. 
Nguyen and al (2015) also identify as predominant determinants of CEMAC inflation: 
domestic supply shocks, exchange rate and monetary shocks. 
In addition to economic and monetary factors, studies have also highlighted the inertial nature 
of inflation, especially for countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. This phenomenon 
would account not only for the lack of flexibility in price adjustment but also for structural 
rigidities (Loungani and Swagel, 2001). 
Since the determinants of inflation are constantly changing according to the structural 
evolution of economies, it is of great importance to examine them again through more recent 
methods. 
3. Determinants of inflation in CEMAC in a panel VAR 
3.1 Model and data 
Most studies that analyze the determinants of inflation typically use error correction models or 
VAR models based on the information provided by the data. In this study, we use a panel 
VAR model with the advantage of addressing the determinants of inflation through a VAR 
approach applied simultaneously to the six countries in the zone. Such an approach makes it 
possible to analyze the overall situation of the determinants of inflation in the CEMAC 
without necessarily worrying about individual disparities. This is also due to the fact that the 
overall situation of the sub-region is sometimes preponderant in the decision-making of the 
Central Bank.  
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The model used have the following form : 
       ( )                   ( ) 
In this representation,     is a vector of stationary variables and  ( ) is a polynomial matrix of 
the lag operator L.    represents the country-specific effect and     represents the error. 
Let's recall that: 
 ( )     
     
       
        ( ) 
   are matrices of coefficients specific to countries and periods. 
The variables we use for each country are, the output gap
3
 (gap),  the growth rate of the 
money supply (gm2), the budget balance (sob), the price of oil (pp), inflation imported 
(inf_imp) and inflation (inflation). 
Due to the presence of country-specific effects, the variables will be subtracted from the mean 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). The final model is therefore of the form:  
 ̃    ( ) ̃     ̃        ( ) 
Where  ̃  , and   ̃  are vectors of variables differentiated at their mean following the Helmert 
approach, which eliminates the unobservable individual effects. Indeed, for K variables and T 
periods, we will have: 
 ̃   ( ̃  
   ̃  
     ̃  
 )         ̃  (  ̃ 
    ̃ 
      ̃ 
 )   
With :        
 ̃  
    (   
   ̅  
 )     ̃ 
    (   
    ̅ 
 )   ̅  
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      ̅ 
  
 
 
∑    
  
           √
   
     
 
After estimating the parameters of the panel VAR, we will identify the impulse response 
functions as well as the variance decomposition using a Cholesky decomposition. We also 
make a structural decomposition of the errors in order to test the robustness of our results. 
Regarding the Cholesky transformation, the results generally depend on the order of 
introduction of the variables, which must be from the most exogenous to the most 
endogenous. Following this approach, we make the following assumptions: 
(i) the price of oil is the most exogenous variable, and therefor is not influenced by 
the other variables of the model. Indeed, given their dependence on oil production 
and their position as a price taker, the main exogenous shock that can significantly 
affect the CEMAC countries concerns the fluctuations in the price of a barrel of  
oil; 
(ii) follow the imported inflation, which may be influenced by the price of oil but not 
necessarily by the other variables of the model instantaneously. As CEMAC 
countries globally face a trade deficit, in the absence of structural transformation 
and diversification of productive structures, imported inflation appears as an 
                                                          
3
 Calculated as the difference between real GDP and potential GDP normalized by real GDP. Potential GDP is 
calculated using the Hodrick and Prescott filter. 
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exogenous factor that can also be affected by oil prices that have an impact on the 
production costs of international partners; 
 
(iii) the money supply which is generally assumed to be exogenous may come in third 
position, implying that it can be influenced by the two preceding variables. Indeed, 
the central bank generally controls the supply of money in relation to two key 
indicators: the situation of foreign exchange reserves (heavily dependent on oil 
prices), and local inflation, which is also affected by imported inflation ; 
 
(iv) the budget balance comes in fourth position, implying that it is influenced by the 
previous variables instantaneously. However, given the high dependence of 
CEMAC countries on oil, we are particularly looking forward to a significant 
response from the budgetary balance to changes in the price of oil. Moreover, the 
fiscal policies of the states can also affect the money supply, and in order to take 
account of this possible double causality, we will in another estimate modify the 
order of the budget balance by swapping it with the money supply ; 
 
(v) the output gap comes in fifth position, implying that it can be influenced by the 
four previous variables. Indeed, this indicator measures the position of the cycle of 
an economy and can therefore be affected by exogenous and endogenous shocks. 
The output gap generally gives an idea of the inflationary pressures affecting the 
economy, and the Phillips curve accounts for this phenomenon and generally 
describes inflation as a phenomenon affected by the output gap ; 
 
(vi) inflation comes last, implying that it can be influenced by all other variables. 
Our vector of variables will therefore have the following form: 
    (                                )  
The study is carried out on a panel made up of all six (06) countries of the CEMAC and 
concerns the annual data from 1990 to 2014. 
 
3.2 Results and recommendations  
i. Results  
As it is usual for such an exercise, we first tested the stationarity of the variables used in our 
VAR in order to detect possible cointegration relationships before estimating the VAR model 
on panel data (PVAR). 
 
Stationarity tests of the variables and VAR stability 
We performed two types of stationarity tests in panel data: 
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• Tests assuming a common unit root for each individual: Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC), 
and Breitung; 
• Tests assuming an individual unit root in the series: Im, Pesaran et Shin (IPS), ADF4-
Fisher, PP
5
-Fisher. 
The results of the stationarity tests (in appendices) indicate that the variables used are 
stationary. In other words, we can estimate a VAR at level without worrying about possible 
cointegration relationships since the variables are not integrated. 
In addition, according to the Schwartz and Hannan-Quin tests (see appendices), the maximum 
lag to be taken into consideration is one. 
Moreover, as shown in figure 6, the estimated VAR is stationary in level, in other words, the 
interpretation of the impulse response functions is not problematic, since all the inverse roots 
of the characteristic polynomial of the lag operator are inside the unit circle, which validates 
Wold's theorem thus guaranteeing the transformation of a VAR into a VMA
6(∞).  
 
Figure 6 – Inversibility of the characteristic polynomial 
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Results of the PVAR on the determinants of inflation 
Our results indicate that, of the variables used to explain inflation in the CEMAC, money 
supply and imported inflation are the most significant. As can be seen from the last line of 
Figure 7 below, when countries are taken together: 
 inflation in the CEMAC does not react to fluctuations in the price of oil. This can 
be justified by the existence of stabilization funds for hydrocarbon prices in some 
countries which would prevent excessive fluctuation in inflation. This result was 
also obtained by Kenkouo (2015); 
 
                                                          
4
 Augmented Dickey Fuller 
5
 Phillips  Perron 
6
 Vector Moving Average 
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 inflation in CEMAC responds positively to positive external price shocks for at 
least four years. In other words, an increase in imported inflation leads to an 
increase in prices in the CEMAC. Imported inflation is therefore a significant 
determinant of short-term inflation. This result is very plausible in the CEMAC as 
countries are net importers and the daily consumption of households is composed 
of a large quantity of imported products; 
 
 the growth of the money supply leads to an increase in inflation. Money can thus 
be counted among the determinants of inflation in the CEMAC. Direct funding 
from the Central Bank to the States facilitate this process ; 
 
 the fiscal balance and the output gap would not be good indicators of inflation in 
the CEMAC. This result may seem ambiguous for African countries because the 
state is the main investor and provider of jobs, but in the short term such a result 
is possible because our estimates show that the output gap reacts to a budgetary 
balance only after about two years. The magnitude of this effect is low, this 
suggests a weakness of the fiscal multiplier. However, this result may hide 
disparities between countries.                                                            
17 
 
 
 Figure 7 – Response of inflation to various shocks 
 
Source : Authors estimation 
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Other results 
In addition to the results on the determinants of inflation, we obtain other results that give 
credit to previous results. Indeed, as can be seen in figure 7 above: 
 imported inflation reacts positively to a rise in oil prices (second figure in the first 
column). As the key CEMAC partners are for the most part net importers of oil, an 
increase in oil prices necessarily affects the production costs of the latter and at the 
same time affects their selling prices; 
 an increase in oil prices affects the money supply of the CEMAC countries. As the 
CEMAC countries are net oil exporters, an increase in oil prices leads to an 
increase in the foreign exchange reserves and therefore to the resources of the 
States, which increases the money supply; 
 the fiscal balance improves as a result of a positive price shock for at least five 
years. This result, which is strongly correlated with the previous one, highlights the 
high dependence of state budgets on oil price fluctuations; 
 changes in the oil price do not significantly affect demand in the CEMAC. This 
result may be justified by the existence of a number of rigidities such as the slow 
adjustment of agents' expectations, the existence of hydrocarbon stabilization funds 
and the control of prices in some States. This result is completely consistent with 
that obtained previously with regard to the effect of oil prices on inflation; 
 a positive shock on the fiscal balance due to, for example, a change in oil prices 
only positively affects activity one year later, and this effect lasts at least two years. 
These results, which are consistent and in line with economic theory and practice in the sub 
region, reinforce our main results discussed above. 
Robustness check 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we first modified the order of the variables in the 
VAR by swapping the budget balance and the money supply, and then we carried out the 
estimates within the framework of a Panel VAR taking into account the structural 
decomposition of errors with short term constraints. According to this approach, the order of 
the variables is of little importance in the determination of the impulse response functions. 
The results (presented in the appendix) are close to those presented in the case of a Cholesky 
decomposition. 
Decomposition of the variance of the forecast error 
In order to better estimate the shares of the different variables in the explanation of inflation 
in the CEMAC, which can be used for the economic policy orientations, we have decomposed 
the variance of the forecast error whose results are contained in Table 3 below. This table 
shows that changes in inflation in the CEMAC are due in order of priority at: 
 68% by its own innovations in the first year. This value decreases over time to 
reach 64% ten years later, thus marking the inertia of inflation in the CEMAC. In 
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other words, the inertia of inflation reflects the slow adjustment of the expectations 
of economic agents. This result also highlights structural rigidities in the CEMAC 
countries, which at the same time limit the growth potential of these economies. 
This includes, for example, the absence of an efficient system for the optimal 
functioning of the labor market (for example, a lack of adjustment of nominal 
wages to inflation) 
 25% by the growth of the money supply during the first year. This value decreases 
slowly over time to 24% ten years later. In other words, through their actions on 
the money supply, the monetary authorities can affect only about 24% of the 
CEMAC inflation, the remaining 76% being due to factors other than the money; 
 5% from imported inflation, 1% from oil prices, 1% from the output gap, and 0% 
from the fiscal balance in the first year. Unlike the other variables, the weight of 
imported inflation, oil price, output gap and fiscal balance in explaining changes in 
inflation is increasing over time to 7%, 1, 5%, 1.7% and 1.8% ten years later. With 
particular reference to the fiscal balance, its effect on inflation appears after the 
second year and is estimated at around 0.4%. 
 
Table 3 – Decomposition of the inflation variance 
        
         Period S.E. GPP INF_IMP GM2 SOB GAP INFLATION 
        
         1  0.244126  1.029183  5.359750  25.02385  0.007885  0.596227  67.98310 
 2  0.247062  1.038622  6.400201  24.52086  0.367487  1.434799  66.23804 
 3  0.247228  1.144291  6.739910  24.25854  0.952134  1.517474  65.38765 
 4  0.247288  1.281106  6.938591  24.06366  1.283641  1.564955  64.86805 
 5  0.247320  1.364538  7.047802  23.95365  1.479333  1.601812  64.55286 
 6  0.247338  1.416412  7.104898  23.88903  1.602688  1.623336  64.36364 
 7  0.247347  1.449595  7.135225  23.85009  1.679232  1.636079  64.24978 
 8  0.247352  1.470526  7.151484  23.82676  1.726188  1.643835  64.18121 
 9  0.247355  1.483578  7.160214  23.81282  1.754893  1.648520  64.13998 
 10  0.247356  1.491661  7.164914  23.80449  1.772369  1.651333  64.11524 
        
        
 
Cholesky Ordering: GPP INF_IMP GM2 SOB GAP INFLATION 
 
        
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to identify the determinants of inflation in the CEMAC 
with a particular emphasis on money supply. The use of a panel VAR model allowed us to 
highlight a number of results, the main ones of which indicate that the money supply and the 
imported inflation explain better the price evolution in the CEMAC than the price of the oil, 
the fiscal balance or the output gap. Fluctuations in inflation are due to about 24% to the 
growth of the money supply. However, there is a very high inertia of inflation, reflecting 
structural problems and a slow adjustment of the expectations of economic agents. 
Such results call on the authorities responsible for price stability issues. In other words, it 
seems useful for the central bank to give particular weight in its analyzes to the core inflation 
which is generally purged from short-term fluctuations and better accounts for the weight of 
money in the explanation of prices. Such a choice would better control the effect of central 
bank actions on prices. 
Our results also suggest a weakness of the fiscal multiplier in CEMAC, a more in-depth study 
on this subject will undoubtedly make it possible to clearly quantify the weight of the action 
of the States on the activity. 
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Appendices 
A. Methodology for calculating the imported inflation indicator 
The calculation of the imported inflation indicator by country was a multi-step process: 
• Identification of main import partners by reference to the average imports over the last 
10 years (2004-2014); 
• Collection of inflation data from the country's three main import partners; 
• Calculation of the countries imported inflation indicator by averaging the inflations of 
the three main import partners weighted by the average imports over the past 10 years. 
The same procedure was used for the calculation of the imported inflation indicator at the sub 
regional level. Over the period, China, France and the United States are the main import 
partners in CEMAC. 
B. Stationarity tests of variables  
 
Méthods 
GAP GM2 GPP INF_IMP SOB INFLATION 
statistic prob* statistic prob statistic prob statistic prob statistic prob statistic prob 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, 
Lin & 
Chu 
-3.944 0.000 -5.631 0.000 -5.818 0.000 -2.018 0.021 -2.212 0.013 -5.894 0.000 
Breitung -1.998 0.023 -3.615 0.000 -3.956 0.000 -4.339 0.000 0.978 0.836 -4.809 0.000 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, 
Pesaran 
and 
Shin 
-5.274 0.000 -4.723 0.000 -5.406 0.000 -2.909 0.002 -1.552 0.060 -4.998 0.000 
ADF - 
Fisher  
48.042 0.000 42.582 0.000 48.469 0.000 28.062 0.005 18.270 0.108 45.214 0.000 
PP - 
Fisher 47.830 0.000 74.194 0.000 58.834 0.000 18.510 0.101 20.798 0.053 57.497 0.000 
*Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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C. Maximum lag test  
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: GPP INF_IMP GM2 SOB GAP INFLATION    
Exogenous variables: C      
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -666.6882 NA   0.032142  13.58966  13.74694  13.65330 
1 -513.9772  283.8264   0.003046*  11.23186   12.33282*   11.67731* 
2 -490.4848  40.81519  0.003952  11.48454  13.52918  12.31181 
3 -449.2319  66.67121  0.003625  11.37842  14.36674  12.58750 
4 -418.7084  45.63109  0.004206  11.48906  15.42106  13.07995 
5 -380.2219  52.87038  0.004263  11.43883  16.31451  13.41153 
6 -326.5803   67.18748*  0.003291   11.08243*  16.90179  13.43695 
7 -297.0879  33.36515  0.004328  11.21390  17.97694  13.95023 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
Decomposition of inflation variance in a PVAR with two variables (money supply and 
inflation) 
    
     Period S.E. GM2 INFLATION 
    
     1  0.200284  21.45811  78.54189 
 2  0.201072  21.09129  78.90871 
 3  0.201079  21.08756  78.91244 
 4  0.201079  21.08752  78.91248 
 5  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
 6  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
 7  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
 8  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
 9  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
 10  0.201079  21.08751  78.91249 
    
 Cholesky Ordering: GM2 INFLATION 
    
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
D. Response functions in the case of a PVAR with modification of the order of the 
variables 
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E. Response functions in the case of a structural PVAR 
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F. Response functions in the case of a PVAR with public  expenditure  
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G. Inflation in the CEMAC: background, calculation methods and limits  
General background on the Consumer Price Index 
In general, the consumer price index measures the changes over time in the general level of prices of 
goods and services acquired (used or paid) by households for consumption
7
. The prices of these 
goods and services are weighted by their share in households’ final consumption expenditure. The 
observation of prices is made by the price surveys on a sample of points of sale mostly carried out by 
the statistical institutes of the different States. 
The representative basket used for the calculation of this index consists of the goods and services that 
the representative households consumed during a reference period. It includes (i) commodities such 
as food and beverages, (ii) durable goods such as clothing, footwear and (iii) services such as 
housing, the consumption of electricity. 
Since the method of calculating this index is standard, it should be noted that the methodology for 
data collection for its calculation has several limitations, including (i) the emergence of new products 
or services not incorporated in the calculation, ii ) the failure to take account of changes in the quality 
of a basket product, (iii) the degree of geographical coverage, which is sometimes limited to large 
cities in some countries. All these limitations may therefore skew the analysis that can be made of 
the interpretation of inflation statistics in the CEMAC. 
In order to better take economic realities into account and to harmonize methodologies for the 
development of this indicator at the supranational level, a new harmonized indicator has been put in 
place: the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (IHPC). 
 
The transition to the HIPC 
The HIPC, used since 2011 in the CEMAC, is a consumer price index calculated according to a 
harmonized method for all countries. The data obtained are harmonized and thus facilitate 
comparison at the international level. The price index used is of Laspeyres type
8
. The HIPC covers 
the total monetary expenditure of the final consumption of resident households in the national 
territory. The prices used are the prices paid by households to acquire consumer goods and services. 
Weights are the aggregate expenditure that households spend on each of the categories of goods and 
services covered.  
The nomenclature used is the Classification of Individual Consumption of households (Classification 
Of Individual  Consumption by Purpose  - COICOP)  which is consistent with the requirements for 
calculating HICPs worldwide. It provides the necessary structure to weight and aggregate the data as 
well as a basis for stratifying the samples of products whose prices are collected. The classification 
of the COICOP nomenclature is composed of 117 classes divided into 47 groups, which provide the 
following 12 functions: food and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages and tobacco; clothing 
and footwear; housing, water, gas, electricity and other fuels; furniture, household articles and 
                                                          
7
 Practical Guide to producing Consumer Price Indices, IMF. 
8
 The Laspeyres price indexes weight current period expenditures by the base period expenditures (the quantities being 
constant between the two period. 
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routine household maintenance; health; transport; communications; leisure and culture; education; 
restaurants and hotels; other goods and services. 
Since BEAC is more sensitive to an average situation in the sub region, and not particularly to the 
situation of each country, a CEMAC indicator is calculated to enable the assessment of the evolution 
of price in the zone. 
 
The calculation of inflation in CEMAC 
The CEMAC consumer price index, IPCC in abbreviated terms calculated and monitored by the 
BEAC, is used to estimate the average variations in the general level of prices in the sub-region. This 
index is the arithmetic mean of the national CPIs, rebased in 2011, and weighted by the country's 
final household consumption share in the total final consumption of resident households in the 
CEMAC. For the sake of consistency, the reference period was set to 2011 due to the adoption by all 
CEMAC countries of the COICOP nomenclature with 12 consumer functions. 
 
One of the limitations of this calculation methodology relates to the final consumption expenditure of 
households which are not currently corrected by the Purchasing Power Parity. This can introduce a 
bias in the analyzes of this CEMAC index. Moreover, this limit can be considered negligible because 
of the single currency in the CEMAC. 
 
